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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN A G G R E G A T E I 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 1 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
OTTO B U E H N E R & COMPANY, a 
corporation, and P A U L B U E H N E R , 
Defendants and Respondents, 
vs. 
D. W. B R I M H A L L , 
Additional Defendant on 
Counterclaim, and Cross-Complainant. 
Petition of Plaintiff-Appellant for 
Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof 
Plaintiff-Appellant American Aggregate Corpor-
ation comes now by its legal counsel Paul E . Reimann, 
and pursuant to Rule 76 (e) and (f) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure respectfully petitions this Honor-
able Court for a rehearing in the above entitled cause, 
for an order vacating the decision which affirms those 
portions of the judgment appealed from, and for con-
sideration of all of the issues raised on appeal, none of 
1 
Case No. 
13478 
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which issues is mentioned in the opinion. In support 
of this motion, counsel for appelant respectfully points 
out that only portions of the undisputed material facts 
are stated in the opinion. Also, there are quotations of 
testimony of adverse witnesses on direct examination 
as factual premises on which the conclusions for affirm-
ance were predicated, which premises were refuted by 
admissions made on cross-examination and by the ex-
press language of written evidence, which quoted testi-
mony even the trial judge rejected and made no find-
ing on such defense. 
As hereinafter set forth in the Statement of Points 
Wherein the Appellant Alleges the Supreme Court 
Erred in its Decision, and also in the Brief in Support 
of Petition for Rehearing, this petition for rehearing 
is based on: (a) Factual errors in the opinion, includ-
ing omission of crucial admissions made by defendants 
and their witnesses; (b) errors in law prejudicial to 
the rights of appellant, including rights under statutes; 
and (c) failure to consider any of the issues raised by 
appellant an appeal, set forth in its Brief. In conse-
quence thereof appellant claims there will be a mis-
carriage of justice unless such errors are corrected on 
rehearing. 
L I M I T A T I O N O F SCOPE O F A P P E A L 
American Aggregate Corporation appealed from 
only portions of the judgment as the same was modi-
fied by the trial court: (a) Paragraph 1 whereby the 
trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint; (b) para-
graph 6 whereby plaintiff was denied costs; (c) from 
failure of the trial court to award plaintiff adequate 
2 
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damages; (d) failure to award plaintiff punitive dam-
ages; and (e) failure to award plaintiff any interest. 
Neither the defendants Buehner nor D. W. Brim-
hall, the independent mining and crushing contractor, 
either appealed or cross-appealed from the judgment 
or any portion thereof. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 
judgment and paragraphs 4 and 5 of the jugment as 
modified on motion of plaintiff, have not been assailed 
by any appeal. 
D E C I S I O N OF T H E COURT ON A P P E A L 
The case on appeal was set for hearing for October 
16, 1974, but this Honorable Court dispensed with oral 
argument. The decision written by the Honorable A. 
H . Ellett, Justice, was filed October 31, 1974. The 
order contained in the opinion affirms "the judgment 
as made." As to the portions of the judgment appealed 
from, counsel for appellant alleges that such affirm-
ance is erroneous both as to facts and as to the law, in 
the particulars hereinafter stated. 
U N D I S P U T E D F A C T S S T A T E D 
I N T H E D E C I S I O N 
In the opinion of this Honorable Court it is stated, 
and counsel for plaintiff-appellant fully agrees there-
with, although counsel does not agree that it is a com-
plete statement of all material undisputed facts: 
"There is no dispute in regard to the following 
matters: 
" 1 . Bigby had filed on land under the mining 
3 
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laws of the United States and was doing assessment 
work thereon. 
"2. Rigby leased the land to American and was to 
receive $1.50 per ton royalty for all quartz aggregate 
mined and sold, and American was to do the assess-
ment work. 
"3. The mineral on the claim was unique white 
quartzite used in making concrete slabs for use in build-
ings. 
"4. American contracted with Brimhall to mine 
and crush the quartzite and to pay $10 per ton out of 
cash received when and as sales were made. 
"5. Buehner Company knew of the above arrange-
ments and had bought aggregate from American on 
prior occasions. 
"6. Buhner Company had a contract to furnish 
slabs in connection with a large building being erected. 
"7. The architect had specified the unique quart-
zite to be used by Buehner. 
"8. Buehner tried to purchase from American but 
would not agree to pay $29.50 per ton. 
"9. Thereafter Buehner went to Brimhall and en-
tered into an agreement with him to buy the aggregate 
at $20.50 per ton f.o.b. Buehner's plant." 
Additional undisputed facts including material and 
crucial admissions made by defendants and their wit-
nesses, and also by Brimhall, not mentioned in the opin-
ion, are stated hereinafter in the list of errors in fact 
and in law and in the Brief which would require re-
versal of the portions of the judgment from which ap-
peal was taken by plaintiff. 
4^ 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS W H E R E I N T H E 
A P P E L L A N T A L L E G E S T H E S U P R E M E 
COURT E R R E D IN ITS DECISION 
1. Although a judicial oversight, it was prejudicial 
error for this Court to affirm paragraph 1 of the judg-
ment dismissing plaintiffs complaint with prejudice, 
when the Buehner Company at the conclusion of the 
trial acknowledged that it owed plaintiff money and 
pretendedly "tendered" a sum without interest into 
court without actually depositing any money, but merely 
lodged with the clerk a check of the Buehner Company 
payable to the order of "D W. Brimhall and American 
Aggregate Company/' 
2. This Court has overlooked the language of para-
graphs 4 and 5 of the judgment as modified by the 
trial judge on motion of plaintiff (to conform to the 
admissions made by Brimhall on cross-examination), 
which paragraphs constitute an adjudication in favor 
of plaintiff (from which no one took an appeal), that 
Brimhall merely had a contract whereby he would mine 
and crush quartzite for plaintiff and receive the agreed 
price of $10 per ton when sales were made and nothing 
more, which adjudication vitiated the unwarranted con-
clusionary "finding" of "joint venture" and "agency". 
3. Part of this Court's opinion is predicated erron-
eously upon the spurious Buehner defense of "release", 
inadmissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, never ex-
ecuted by plaintiff, refuted by defendants' own admis-
sions and by Exhibit 40-P which showed that the pur-
ported transaction was between defendant corporation 
and a third party, on which defense the trial court made 
no finding nor any adjudication in favor of defendants. 
5 
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4. The cases do not hold that the trier of the fact 
can isolate and extract out of context some statement 
of a witness and ignore his contrary admissions made 
on cross-examination, nor permit a disregard of undis-
puted evidence including the express language of a 
written document prepared and executed by the wit-
ness, nor otherwise act arbitrarily, instead of as a rea-
sonable and intelligent person. 
5. This Court has not fully considered the legal 
right of plaintiff to fix and quote its own prices, and 
the lack of any right on the part of defendant Buehner 
Company as a competitor of plaintiff to dictate plain-
tiff's prices or to circumvent plaintiff's rights to sell at 
its own quoted prices, or defendants' conduct which 
induced Brimhall to accept $5,000 for conversion and 
sale of plaintiff's materials at $20.50 per ton (which 
was below plaintiff's costs), to the detriment of plain-
tiff and the unjust enrichment of defendants. 
6. There was no competent evidence of any "joint 
venture", and Exhibit I9-P could not correctly be con-
strued as a contract with a "joint venture" since none 
was named on that document which was prepared and 
issued by the Buehner Company to Brimhall personally 
with all proceeds payable to Brimhall and nothing to 
plaintiff. 
7. Exhibit 19-P, the Brimhall purchase order, 
could not properly be construed to relate to any job 
except the job designated thereon by job-number, 
which was the new church office building job; and it 
could not be construed to constitute an open-end pur-
chase order for a multiplicity of unrelated jobs not 
mentioned thereon. 
6 
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8. The Court overlooked the fact that the Buehners 
never paid for 90% of the materials delivered each 30 
days as specified in Exhibit 19-P, and defendants 
could not equitably be excused from paying interest 
after long delays. 
9. I t is undisputed that defendants did not issue 
any purchase order to plaintiff during the period in 
controversy, and there was no competent evidence of 
"ratification" by plaintiff of the Brimhall purchase 
order or of any claim to purchase at $20.50 per ton, 
since plaintiff refused to execute the Brimhall purchase 
order because it was below plaintiff's quoted prices, and 
also below plaintiff's costs; but there was merely an 
oral promise by plaintiff in May 1970 not to sue de-
fendants if defendants complied with four conditions, 
not one of which was performed. 
10. Defendants engaged in a cover-up involving 
withholding information from plaintiff for many 
months, and the furnishing of false information, which 
discredited defendants. 
11. The figure of $20.50 per ton was below plain-
tiff's costs; consequently this Court erred in not con-
sidering the issue of liability of defendants for viola-
tions of the Utah Unfair Practices Act and statutes 
prohibiting price-fixing and restraint of trade, which 
rendered void any purported agreement oral or written 
which was designed to obtain plaintiff's goods at a 
price below its costs. 
12. Paul Buehner practiced deceit upon Brimhall 
to induce him to accept Exhibit 19-P, defendants also 
attempted to practice deceit upon plaintiff, and even 
practiced deceit upon the trial court by fictious claims 
7 
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on counterclaim and by false testimony, so that de-
fendants and their witnesses could not reasonably be 
believed by the court on any matter in conflict with 
the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses and admissions of 
defendants made on cross-examination, whether the 
doctrine of estoppel by oath or quasi estoppel is invoked. 
The foregoing points are discussed in the Brief in 
Support of this Petition for Rehearing, heroto attached 
and incorporated herein by reference. 
Respectfully submitted, 
AMERICAN AGGREGATE 
CORPbRATIpN, 
1
 .^(kAJ^y V_ J* SHAJ^AS^KAAM^^ 
By P A U L K R E I M A N N 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant-
Petitioner 
S 
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B R I E F I N S U P P O R T O F 
P E T I T I O N F O R R E H E A R I N G 
1. A L T H O U G H A J U D I C I A L OVER-
S I G H T , I T W A S P R E J U D I C I A L E R R O R 
F O R T H I S COURT TO A F F I R M PARA-
G R A P H 1 O F T H E J U D G M E N T DISMISS-
ING PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT WITH 
PREJUDICE, W H E N T H E B U E H N E R COM-
P A N Y A T T H E CONCLUSION O F T H E 
T R I A L A C K N O W L E G E D T H A T I T O W E D 
P L A I N T I F F M O N E Y A N D P R E T E N D E D L Y 
"TENDERED" A SUM WITHOUT INTEREST 
I N T O COURT W I T H O U T A C T U A L L Y D E -
P O S I T I N G A N Y MONEY, B U T M E R E L Y 
L O D G E D W I T H T H E C L E R K A C H E C K O F 
T H E B U E H N E R COMPANY P A Y A B L E TO 
T H E O R D E R O F "D. W. B R I M H A L L A N D 
A M E R I C A N A G G R E G A T E COMPANY:' 
At the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Ashton on be-
half of defendant Buehner Company stated, " I would 
like to make a tender in court". He said, "That is a 
total of $17,132.85 which I tender into court." (R. 658, 
Ab. 95). As pointed out on page 61 of the Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellant (hereinafter referred to as 
"Brief"), "There was no tender or deposit in court 
under Rule 67 or Rule 68, for no money was deposited 
or placed under the control of the court." Rule 67 
clearly contemplates that the money shall actually be 
deposited with the clerk, "subject to the further direc-
tion of the court." Instead of a deposit of money with 
the clerk, a corporate check dated June 6, 1973, of 
Otto Buehner & Company in the sum of $17,132.85 
without any interest for the many months of delay, was 
9 
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left with the clerk, not payable to the clerk of the court, 
but to "D. W. Brimhall Company and American Ag-
gregate Company." (Ab. 139). The clerk could not 
cash such check and invest the money pending final 
determination of the rights of the parties. 
Defendants thereby attempted to force plaintiff 
to bargain with Brimhall, and to cut off plaintiff's right 
of appeal, if possible. The trial court should have 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff at least for the 
amount defendant Buehner Company acknowledged it 
should pay. Instead, the court was wrongfully induced 
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, and 
place plaintiff at the whim and caprice of Brimhall, an 
adverse party. The check has been stale-dated for 17 
months and does not have to be honored at the bank. 
During the entire period of time defendant has had 
the use and benefit of the money said defendant ac-
knowledged that it owed, by falsely pretending to 
tender money into court when it had no intention of 
doing so. There has been no compliance with the rule. 
Defendants had no right to substitute a scheme of their 
own to force the plaintiff to negotiate with Brimhall. 
Even if the check were withdrawn, plaintiff could not 
cash it without the consent of Brimhall, and plaintiff 
would be forced into another lawsuit just because de-
fendants were unwilling to comply with the rules and 
insist on making rules of their own in defiance of the 
statutes and the rules of the Court. 
2. THIS COURT HAS OVERLOOKED 
THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 
5 OF THE JUDGMENT AS MODIFIED BY 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ON MOTION OF 
PLAINTIFF (TO CONFORM TO THE AD-
10 
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MISSIONS M A D E BY B R I M H A L L ON 
C R O S S - E X A M I N A T I O N ) , W H I C H PARA-
G R A P H S A R E AN ADJUDICATION I N FAV-
OR O F P L A I N T I F F (FROM W H I C H NO ONE 
TOOK AN A P P E A L ) , T H A T B R I M H A L L 
M E R E L Y H A D A CONTRACT W H E R E B Y 
H E W O U L D M I N E A N D C R U S H QUART-
Z I T E F O R P L A I N T I F F A N D R E C E I V E T H E 
A G R E E D P R I C E O F $10 P E R TON W H E N 
S A L E S W E R E M A D E A N D NOTHING 
MORE, W H I C H A D J U D I C A T I O N V I T I A T E D 
T H E U N W A R R A N T E D CONCLUSIONARY 
" F I N D I N G " O F ' J O I N T V E N T U R E " A N D 
"AGENCY." 
After reading a list of undisputed matters listed 
in the opinion as paragraphs 1 to 9, counsel for plain-
tiff-appellant expected to read an order for reversal of 
the portions of the judgment appealed from, but was 
surprised to a point of profound shock, when he read 
the rest of the opinion and the order for affirmance 
of the entire judgment including the portions from 
which plaintiff appealed. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this 
Court's statement of undisputed matters are: 
"4. American contracted with Brimhall to 
mine and crush the quartzite and to pay $10 per 
ton out of cash received when and as sales were 
made. 
"5. Buehner Company knew of the above ar-
rangements and had bought aggregate on prior 
occasions." 
I t was also undisputed that Buehner Company 
previously had purchased aggregate from American at 
the regular price of $35 per ton as shown by Exhibit 
11 
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4-P. (R. 30-31, Ab. 4, 97-101). Paragraph 8 of the 
list of undisputed facts implies that plaintiff's quoted 
price was $29.50 per ton to Buehners on the quantity 
for this particular job. I t is undisputed that Buehner 
Company asked plaintiff for a quotation before it sub-
mitted its bid on the caststone to the prime contractor, 
and that plaintiff gave the same quotation after the 
Buehner Company was awarded the subcontract; and 
that defendants not only tried to chisel and dictate 
prices of American as their competitor to a point be-
low cost, but resorted to deceit, overreaching, unfair 
trade practices, unlawful price-fixing, and a cover-up, 
to obtain unjust enrichment, and defendants even prac-
ticed deceit on the trial court; as detailed in the Brief 
of Plaintiff-Appellant, and hereinafter mentioned. 
In the opinion this Court states that "The trial 
court found that Brimhall was a joint venturer with 
plaintiff and as such was authorized to act as agent 
and to make the contract to sell the rock at the price of 
$20.50 per ton." The so-called "finding" was an unwar-
ranted conclusion, contradicted by Brimhall's admis-
sions on cross-examination, and did not constitute a 
proper finding of fact. Furthermore, as hereinafter 
pointed out, it was vitiated by paragraphs 4 and 5 of 
the judgment as amended on motion. (Ab. 143-144). 
Paragraph 8 of the findings of fact states: 
"8. The defendant [on counterclaim] and the 
plaintiff American Aggregate Corporation en-
tered into a joint agreement to crush the aggre-
gate for $10.00 per ton, which agreement was 
subsequently modified to provide for payment of 
$7.25 per ton." (Ab. 141). 
This Court in its opinion states that "Our duty 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is to affirm the trial court if there is competent evidence 
in the record to sustain the finding." (Undoubtedly 
the last word should read "judgment"). The opinion 
on page 2 proceeds to supply a "finding" not made by 
the trial court which is utterly inconsistent with Brim-
hall's admissions on eross-examinaion and paragraphs 
4 and 5 of the judgment as amended. The opinion er-
roneously states that "Mr. Brimhall was called as a 
witness by the plainiff", when he was called for cross-
examination as an adverse witness. The opinion quotes 
Brimhall as testifying that 
"he operated under an unsigned written agree-
ment drawn up by counsel for American where-
by he was to mine and crush the quartzite and 
was to be paid $10 per ton therefor, that Ameri-
can was to haul the material sold and was to be 
paid $8 per ton for hauling, and that $1.50 per 
ton was to be paid as royalty to Bigby and the 
profit, if any, made from the sale was to be 
divided between American and Brimhall." 
I t is difficult to imagine just how someone could 
operate under an unsigned written agreement, when a 
document which is not executed is not a written agree-
ment. This Court overlooks the fact that Brimhall's 
statement was completely destroyed by his admissions 
on cross-examination, which showed that there could not 
have been any joint venture, for Brimhall contracted 
to perform certain services as an independent contractor 
for a flat fee of $10 per ton and no more. Those ad-
missions on cross-examination detailed in the Brief, 
clearly showed that the $10 not only covered mining 
and crushing, but removing overburden, separation of 
aggregate into stock piles, moving equipment in and 
out, depreciation and overhead expenses, and also his 
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anticipated profit. (R. 209, 214-216, 250, 278-279, 333-
335, 566-568, 605-606, 620, Ab. 27-29, 33, 36, 41-42, 
80, 86-87, 89-90, 93). Brimhall was not to share any 
profits or in any losses with plaintiff. Consequently, 
there could not have been a joint venture. 
The strange story of Brimhall quoted in part in 
the opinion, not only was completely discredited by 
his admissions on cross-examination, but the trial judge 
could not reasonably believe it, and he did not make 
any finding to support it nor incorporate such a claim 
into the judgment. As pointed out hereinafter, the 
judgment as amended clearly negates any claim to any-
thing above the fixed fee. The $10 per ton guaranteed 
to Brimhall for all of his services, included a profit of 
$3 per ton over the prevailing price in the area of $7 
per ton which also included a profit. Brimhall claimed 
that plantiff was allowed to recover only two items of 
expense, $1.50 for royalty and $8 for hauling regard-
less of distance, or a total of only $9.50 per ton regard-
less of the many additional costs and expenses of plain-
tiff, and then split the difference with Brimhall for the 
sale proceeds over the $19.50 per ton. Reasonable 
minds could not conclude that an attorney would write 
such a weird document which would guarantee the 
adverse party a profit both ways and make certain that 
his own client would suffer a loss. Obviously, if such 
an absurd "agreement" had been submitted to Brim-
hall, he would not have hesitated to sign it. The trial 
judge, particularly in the amendment of the judgment, 
completely rejected such an unconscionable claim. 
"The rule is that the testimony of a witness is no 
stronger than where it is left on cross-examination." 
Obert v. Saunders, 111 Utah 507, 518, 184 P . 2d 229. 
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This applies, of course, not only to admissions made by 
Brimhall, but also to the admissions made by Paul 
Buehner and other witnesses for defendants. Brimhall 
admitted that he never was paid anything in excess of 
$10 per ton, although the regular price of the aggregate 
was $35 per ton. Competent evidence must include the 
admissions made by a party, and exclude testimony 
destroyed by the witness on his cross-examination. 
Counsel for appellant was shocked to learn that 
counsel for defendants prepared and had the trial court 
sign a judgment which awarded judgment to Brimhall 
against plaintiff for $37,149.00 without any credit for 
the $29,000.00 Brimhall had collected, and which al-
lowed Brimhall for himself the $5,000.00 "move-in 
cost" paid to him by the Buehners. Counsel for plain-
tiff filed a motion to modify and amend the judgment. 
Counsel for Brimhall also asked for certain modifica-
tions to obtain amounts in excess of the fixed fee of $10 
per ton which had been reduced to $7.25 per ton. Para-
graphs 4 and 5 of the judgment as modified and 
amended by the trial court, constitute an adjudication 
in favor of the plaintiff, which vitiates any conclusion-
ary finding of a "joint venture" and resulting "agency": 
"4. Bv reason of the settlement agreement 
made between plaintiff A M E R I C A N AG-
G R E G A T E CORPORATION and D. W. 
B R I M H A L L on July 9, 1970, D. W. BRIM-
H A L L became entitled to $7.25 per ton instead 
of $10.00 per ton for his mining and crushing 
services on all tonnage of aggregate shipped to 
defendant OTTO B U E H N E R & COMPANY 
totaling 5,172 tons, less a credit of $29,000.00 
collected bv D. W. B R I M H A L L on the first 
4,000 tons shipped to defendant OTTO B U E H -
N E R k COMPANY in 1969 and 1970, leaving 
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a balance of $8,497.00 payable to D. W. 
B R I M H A L L computed at the rate of $7.25 
per ton for the 1172 tons in excess of the first 
4.000 tons, which amount shall be payable to him 
out of the money deposited or to be deposited in 
court by defendant OTTO B U E H N E R & 
COMPANY. 
"5. Under said settlement agreement, as to 
said 5,172 tons, D. W. B R I M H A L L was not 
entitled to $5,000.00 'move-in-costs' paid to him 
by OTTO B U E H N E R & COMPANY, nor 
to make any other charge against plaintiff in 
excess of said $7.25 per ton." (R. 941). (Italics 
added). 
Neither Brimhall nor the defendants took any ap-
peal or cross-appealed from paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 
judgment as modified and amended, and such judg-
ment is conclusive and cannot be impeached by a con-
clusionary "finding" of "joint venture" and resulting 
"agency" which the trial court finally adjudicated to 
the contrary, based upon Brimhalls own sworn admis-
sions. The judgment as amended did not include any 
adjudication that there was either a "joint venture" or 
an "agency". Nor do conclusions of law 4 and 5 as 
amended give credence to any theory of "joint ven-
ture" or "agency." 
Rule 54 (a) clearly states that a " 'Judgment' as 
used in these rules includes a decree and any order 
from which an appeal lies." No right of appeal exists 
from a mere finding. Nor can a mere finding overturn 
the judgment itself. As observed by the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts in Olsen v. Qhen, 2 N. E . 
2d 475, 476: 
"Ordinarily only a final judgment or decree, 
as distinguished from a mere finding, amounts 
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to an adjudication or becomes evidence of a fact 
in another case. * * * 
"A fact merely found becomes adjudicated 
by a final judgment or decree only when it is 
shown to have been the basis of the relief, denial 
of relief or other ultimate right established by 
the judgment or decree. * * *" 
3. P A R T O F T H I S C O U R T S O P I N I O N I S 
P R E D I C A T E D E R R O N E O U S L Y U P O N T H E 
S P U R I O U S B U E H N E R D E F E N S E O F "RE-
L E A S E " , I N A D M I S S I B L E U N D E R T H E 
P A R O L E V I D E N C E R U L E , N E V E R E X -
E C U T E D B Y P L A I N T I F F , R E F U T E D B Y 
D E F E N D A N T S ' OWN A D M I S S I O N S A N D 
BY E X H I B I T 40-P W H I C H S H O W E D T H A T 
T H E P U R P O R T E D TRANSAC T ION W A S 
B E W E E N D E F E N D A N T CORPORATION 
A N D A T H I R D P A R T Y , ON W H I C H D E -
F E N S E T H E T R I A L COURT M A D E NO 
F I N D I N G NOR A N Y A D J U D I C A T I O N I N 
F A V O R O F D E F E N D A N T S . 
The last 12 lines of page 2 and the first 7 lines 
of page 3 of the opinion quote from the testimony of 
Paul Buehner on a challenged defense of "release" and 
"ratification" relating to preparation of some molds. 
The evidence is conclusive that the transaction was not 
between defendants and plaintiff, but between the 
Buehner Company and Style-Crete, Inc., which was 
not a party to the suit. The testimony of Buehner was 
inadmissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, for he 
tried to contradict and vary the terms of a written 
document relating to the molds, Exhibit 40-P which 
was prepared by defendant Otto Buehner & Company 
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and executed by said defendant company and Style-
Crete, Inc., never by plaintiff. 
The transaction relating to the molds for oxen 
for the Ogden and Provo temples on which Style-
Crete, Inc. had the subcontracts for cast-stone, never 
was negotiated with plaintiff at all. Reasonable minds 
would be compelled to conclude that if such transaction 
was to constitute an agreement with plaintiff for re-
duction by plaintiff of the price of aggregate to $20.50 
per ton (which was below plaintiff's costs), defendant 
Otto Buehner & Company would have made plaintiff 
a party to the document by signature and specified that 
figure of $20.50 per ton in that document. Buehner 
tied the purportedly "agreed reduction" in price down 
to $20.50 a ton to the transaction relating to the molds 
for oxen, which was not a transaction involving plain-
tiff at all, but one with a third party, Style-Crete, Inc., 
which was not a party to the suit and which had no 
interest in the aggregate: Exhibit 40-P prepared by 
the Buehner Company to finalize the transaction relat-
ing to the molds, omitted any mention of any aggregate 
or any price on aggregate owned by American Aggre-
gate. Obviously, if Buehners could have escaped liabil-
ity by such a transaction, they would not have neglected 
to mention it in the written agreement. 
Exhibit 40-P is dated March 18, 1971, prepared 
by Otto Buehner & Company and submitted to Style-
Crete, Inc., does not mention plaintiff's name, and 
made no reference to the aggregate owned by American 
Aggregate Corporation. Buehner's testimony on direct 
examination was destroyed on cross-examination. In-
stead of the Buehner company being so generous as 
Paul Buehner tried to picture in his misleading testi-
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mony, Exhibit 40-P (Ab. 126) prepared by his com-
pany March 18, 1971, and accepted March 24, 1971, by 
Style-Crete, Inc., clearly shows that Otto Buehner & 
Company merely furnished models for oxen, two plaster 
casts and one concrete. Style-Crete, Inc., did not re-
ceive any finished models at all, for the agreement 
stated: 
«* * * Style Crete, Inc. is to have rubber molds 
made for these fonts using the above named 
models. After the precast units for the above 
captioned temples are produced, the molds and 
models are to be delivered to and become the 
property of the Otto Buehner § Company. In 
addition, Style Crete, Inc., shall pay to Otto 
Buehner & Company, the sum of $2,000.00." 
(Italics added). 
Style-Crete, Inc., had the expense of making the 
finished molds and models, and after Style-Crete, Inc., 
completed the precast units for the Ogden and Provo 
Temples, those molds and models were to be delivered 
to Otto Buehner & Company and become its properties. 
Those finished molds and models prepared by Style-
Crete, which the Buehner Company needed for the 
Washington Temple, cost thousands of dollars. 
The trial court did not make any finding "nor any 
adjudication in favor of defendants Buehner on the 
fictitious defense of "release". I t was conclusive that 
plaintiff was not a party to that transaction at all, and 
that if defendants had intended to get a "release" they 
would have made plaintiff a party to Exhibit 40-P and 
would have had plaintiff execute it. 
4. T H E CASES D O NOT H O L D T H A T 
T H E T R I E R OF T H E F A C T CAN I S O L A T E 
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A N D E X T R A C T OUT O F C O N T E X T SOME 
S T A T E M E N T O F A W I T N E S S A N D I G N O R E 
H I S C O N T R A R Y A D M I S S I O N S M A D E ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION, NOR P E R M I T A 
D I S R E G A R D O F U N D I S P U T E D E V I D E N C E 
I N C L U D I N G T H E E X P R E S S L A N G U A G E 
O F A W R I T T E N D O C U M E N T P R E P A R E D 
A N D E X E C U T E D B Y T H E W I T N E S S , NOR 
O T H E R W I S E ACT A R B I T R A R I L Y , IN-
S T E A D O F AS A R E A S O N A B L E A N D IN-
T E L L I G E N T P E R S O N . 
We are aware of the rule that the trial court should 
be affirmed if there is sufficient competent evidence in 
the record to support the judgment. However, in De-
Fas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133 at 137, 369 P . 2d 290, 
cited in the footnote, this Honorable Court said: 
«# * * The court's prerogative of course does 
not go so far as to stubbornly ignore and refuse 
to be guided by credible, uncontradicted evidence 
when all reasonable minds would accept it. That 
could result in arbitrary and unreasoning denial 
or distortion of justice. Nevertheless, because of 
the prerogative just mentioned as judge of all 
aspects of the case, if the testimony of a witness 
is affected with any frailty which might reason-
ably be considered as casting suspicion upon it 
or discrediting its accuracy or truthfulness, the 
court is not bound to accept such tesimony as 
the fact and so find. And the rule is not other-
wise because the witness happened to be a party 
to the action." 
On page 1 of the opinion this Court states 9 items 
of undisputed facts, which counsel for plaintiffs believe 
would require a reversal of the portion of the judgment 
from which an appeal was taken; but there are addi-
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tional facts undisputed in the record which the trial 
court, (which was unable to try the case on successive 
days), overlooked or possibly forgot in the delay be-
fore a memorandum was issued. The trial judge upon 
subsequent motion by counsel for plaintiff did amend 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the conclusions of law and para-
graphs 4 and 5 of the judgment, which remedied the 
damage as to Brimhall. 
On page 2 of the opinion the Court quotes a small 
portion of the testimony of Paul Buehner in which 
he said that he had a conversation with Don Reimann 
(vice-president of plaintiff) in which Buehner said that 
'w'e had a purchase order with Mr. Chidester and that 
if we were going to change it we had to know immedi-
ately" and Buehner said he could "work it out with 
Mr. Brimhall" and Don said, "yes, you go ahead." 
Buehner only told a half-truth, for Don Reiman told 
Buehner he could deal with Brimhall as to sizes, not as 
to prices. (R. 365-366, Ab. 48). On cross-examination 
Buehner admitted that he knew it had been the prac-
tice all along to give the aggregate sizes to the crushing 
contractor. (R. 156, Ab. 21). 
The opinion omits entirely the admissions made by 
Buehner on cross-examination, which not only show 
that he had to deal with plaintiff on prices, but that 
Buehner used Brimhall as an agent or tool to attempt 
to get plaintiff to lower the special quoted price of 
$29.50 per ton (which was $5.50 below the regular price 
of $35 per ton). First Buehner said the price was "too 
high." Don Reimann told him that $29.50 per ton was 
the same quotation to everyone for that quantity. (R. 
336-337, Ab. 42). Buehner then falsely represented 
that he could purchase that material or similar material 
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from Chidester for $19.50 a ton. I t is undisputed that 
Don Reimann said "they couldn't get that material un-
less they stole it from us. I t was specified on the job." 
Buehner falsely represented that they could substitute 
materials, but Don Reimann said he found out from the 
architect that no substitutions would be allowed. (R. 
337-339, Ab. 42-43). Plainiff refused to lower its 
quotation. Reasonable minds would have to conclude 
that plaintiffs officers would not consent to lowering 
the price to $20.50 a ton (which was below plaintiffs 
total costs), when no one except plaintiff could then 
furnish such materials. Furthermore, plaintiff never 
signed any document enforceable under the Statute of 
Frauds, to sell at the below-cost of $20.50 a ton. 
Buehner admitted on cross-examination that he 
then "had Mr. Brimhall go back and forth to American 
Aggregate Corporation several times." (R. 45, Ab. 6) . 
For whose benefit? Obviously for the benefit of the 
Buehners, for Buehner admitted that he told Brimhall 
to tell plaintiff that the "price was too high" and to 
talk to Don and Rich Reimann to see if they would 
lower the figure. (R. 47-48, Ab. 6-7). After some 
further discussions Buehner falsely represented to 
Brimhall that the Buehners planned to take all sizes 
or what was known as crusher run instead of "selected 
sizes", and Brimhall said it would make considerable 
difference in the quotation. Buehner testified that he 
told Brimhall to find out what kind of a quote Ameri-
can Aggregate would give on "crusher run." Buehner 
admitted that Mr. Brimhall reported back from plain-
tiff a quotation of $25.50 per ton for "crusher run", 
and that it was the lowest figure plaintiff would take; 
but Buehner said, "No deal/9 (R. 45-47, Ab. 6) . 
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From all of Buehner's admissions, reasonable 
minds would have to conclude that Buehners knew that 
the plaintiff would not lower its quotation to $20.50 
per ton and that plaintiff would not accept a purchase 
order for a below-cost price of $20.50 per ton. 
5. T H I S COURT H A S N O T F U L L Y CON-
S I D E R E D T H E L E G A L R I G H T O F P L A I N -
T I F F TO F I X A N D Q U O T E I T S O W N 
P R I C E S , A N D T H E LACK OF A N Y R I G H T 
ON T H E P A R T OF D E F E N D A N T B U E H N E R 
COMPANY AS A C O M P E T I T O R O F P L A I N -
T I F F TO D I C T A T E P L A I N T I F F ' S P R I C E S 
OR TO C I R C U M V E N T P L A I N T I F F ' S 
R I G H T S TO S E L L A T I T S OWN Q U O T E D 
P R I C E S , OR T H E UNCONSCIONABLE CON-
D U C T O F D E F E N D A N T S W H I C H I N D U C E D 
B R I M H A L L TO A C C E P T $5,000 F O R CON-
V E R S I O N A N D S A L E O F P L A I N T I F F ' S MA-
T E R I A L S A T $20.50 P E R TON ( W H I C H W A S 
B E L O W P L A I N T I F F ' S COSTS), TO T H E 
D E T R I M E N T OF P L A I N T I F F A N D T H E 
U N J U S T E N R I C H M E N T O F D E F E N D A N T S . 
Otto Buehner & Company and its controlling of-
ficer Paul Buehner had no right to dictate or fix plain-
tiff's prices nor conspire with Brimhall or with any 
one else to fix those prices to the advantage of defend-
ants and detriment of plaintiff. This is entirely over-
looked in the opinion, along with the undisputed evid-
ence as to what occurred behind the backs of plaintiff's 
officers. Buehners knew the price of the plaintiff's ag-
gregate before plaintiff submitted its bid to the prime 
contractor. That price was $29.50 per ton for "selected 
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sizes" instead of the regular price of $35 per ton. After 
the Buehner Company obtained the subcontract on the 
caststone, plaintiff again furnished the identical quota-
tion of $29.50 a ton. The Buehners arbitrarily de-
clared they would not pay that much, and Paul Bueh-
ner said that if he couldn't get this material at his price, 
he was going to have a substitution. (R. 221-222, Ab. 
30). H e thereby threatened to cheat the prime con-
tractor and the Church as owner by a substitution 
which he knew was not authorized. 
When Buehner said "No deal" to Brimhall when 
he reported $25.50 a ton quotation from plaintiff on 
"crusher run", and told Buehner that plaintiff would 
not go below $25.50, Buehner then offered Brimhall 
$20.50 a ton plus $5,000 "move-in", if Brimhall would 
sign a purchase order with the Buehners. Brimhall 
accepted on the basis of Buehner's promise to take all 
sizes or "crusher run." I t was undisputed from Brim-
hall's admissions on cross-examination and deposition 
that the contract between plaintiff as owner and Brim-
hall as mining and crushing contractor, whereby Brim-
hall was to receive $10 per ton for all services, included 
moving equipment in and out of the quarry. Conse-
quently, the $5,000 which Paul Buehner promised to 
pay Brimhall if he would sign a purchase order to sell 
the materials at $20.50 per ton to the Buehner Com-
pany was an illegal inducement to convert and sell 
plaintiff's materials below cost to the detriment of 
plaintiff and the unjust enrichment of defendants. 
Neither Brimhall nor Buehner risked sending plaintiff 
a copy of such purchase order, Exhibit 19-P. 
Nor could there be any possible implication that 
Brimhall was "acting as agent" when he acted adversely 
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to plaintiff for unjust enrichment of a competitor of 
plaintiff. 
6. T H E R E W A S NO C O M P E T E N T E V I -
D E N C E O F A N Y " J O I N T V E N T U R E " , A N D 
E X H I B I T 19-P COULD N O T CORRECTLY 
B E C O N S T R U E D AS A CONTRACT W I T H A 
" J O I N T V E N T U R E " S INCE N O N E W A S 
N A M E D ON T H A T D O C U M E N T W H I C H 
W A S P R E P A R E D A N D I S S U E D BY T H E 
B U E H N E R COMPANY TO B R I M H A L L PER-
SONALLY W I T H A L L P R O C E E D S PAY-
A B L E TO B R I M H A L L A N D N O T H I N G TO 
P L A I N T I F F . 
In Koumans v. White Star Gas <§ Oil Co., 92 Utah 
24, 63 P . 2d 231 it was held that a "joint venture" is 
subject to the law of partnership. In Bates v. Simpson, 
121 Utah 165, 239 P . 2d 749, it was held that a joint 
venture, being in the nature of a partnership, cannot 
arise except by consent of the parties under an agree-
ment to share profits and losses. Brimhall expressly 
disclaimed that he was to share in any losses. There 
was no competent evidence of any joint venture under 
the undisputed facts stated in the opinion, or under 
the undisputed facts admitted by Brimhall on cross-
examination. Brimhall never had been paid anything 
in excess of $10 per ton although the regular price 
for the aggregate was $35 per ton. (R. 278-279, 620, 
Ab. 36,90). 
Section 48-1-3, U. C. A., Uniform Partnership 
Act, specifies that "A partnership is an association of 
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business 
for profit." Brimhall was an independent contractor, 
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and he was not a co-owner of the quarry lease, nor of 
the aggregate, by his own admsisions under oath. Even 
if there is a general partnership and not a limited part-
nership, Section 48-1-6(1), U.C.A. 1953, makes a 
partner "an agent of the partnership for the purpose 
of its business, * * * including the execution in the 
partnership name of any instrument for apparently 
carrying on in the usual way the business of the part-
nership * * *." Brimhall never had conducted any sales. 
From the time defendants pleaded by counterclaim 
that plaintiff was a party to Exhibit 19-P, plaintiff 
invoked the Parol Evidence Rule, and moved to strike, 
for that purchase order did not purport to be in the 
name of both Brimhall and plaintiff, for plaintiff's 
name was not mentioned at all. Defendants alone pre-
pared Exhibit 19-P. If they had entertained any be-
lief that there was a joint venture of some kind, they 
would certainly have included the names of both plain-
tiff and Brimhall. However, defendants specified per-
formance solely by Brimhall as "seller", and plaintiff's 
name was not even mentioned. Brimhall admitted that 
under his oral agreement with plaintiff he was to be 
paid the $10 a ton for all of his services when the sale 
was made and the money collected. That did not give 
him any right to make a contract of sale nor to collect 
the money and pocket it. However, defendants made 
all money payable solely to Brimhall, which negates 
any concept of "joint venture." Furthermore, after 
frustrating attempts of plaintiff to obtain a purchase 
order from defendant Buehner Company, and to find 
out what was going on, the president of plaintiff corp-
oration in February 1970, asked defendant's office 
manager when plaintiff was going to be paid for the 
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aggregate going out of plaintiff's leasehold to the Bueh-
ner plant, and said manager bluntly told plaintiff's 
president, "You are not going to get paid/' (R. 451-
453, Ab. 61-62). Thus, defendants did not intend that 
the money for the aggregate under Exhibt 19-P would 
be paid to any one except Brimhall. 
There was a conclusive reason why neither Brim-
hall nor either of the defendants was willing to even 
send plaintiff a copy of the putative "purchase order." 
Not only was all of the money made payable exclusively 
to Brimhall, but Exhibit 19-P would have revealed that 
the Buehner Company had wrongfully agreed to give 
Brimhall $5,000 for turning over to the Buehner Com-
pany plaintiff's aggregate at the below-cost figure of 
$20.50 a ton as unlawfully dictated by the Buehners, 
under the vicious subterfuge of "move-in-costs". Brim-
hall admitted under oath that the $10 a ton included 
everything, including "moving equipment in and out" 
of the quarry. Consequently, the promise of $5,000 was 
an unlawful inducement to Brimhall to sign a docu-
ment under which the Buehner Company would be 
enabled to divert 4,000 tons of plaintiff's aggregate 
from the quarry to the Buehner plant for conversion 
to the use and benefit and unjust enrichment of de-
fendants, and to the detriment of plaintiff as owner. 
Since plaintiff knew that the Buehners had to have 
that material owned by plaintiff, and plaintiff had re-
fused to allow the Buehners to dictate the price for 
plaintiff's materials, if either Brimhall or defendants 
had dared to send plaintiff a copy of Exhibit 19-P, 
plaintiff would have taken measures to stop the looting 
operation. Defendants knew Brimhall had no right to 
sell because they repeatedly had obtained quotations 
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from plaintiff directly, then used Brimhall as their 
agent or tool to attempt to get lower quotations down 
o the last minute before conspiring to defraud plain-
tiff. Defendants knew that plaintiff would not accept 
a purchase order at $20.50 per ton or for less than 
plaintiff's quoted prices. 
The Buehner Company then secretly made a writ-
ten contract with Clark Tank Lines to haul 4,000 tons, 
dated November 11, 1969, Exhibit 5-D (Ab. 102. That 
was not even disclosed to plaintiff until after com-
mencement of the trial. The plaintiff was told by Brim-
hall that the Buehners were going to use the aggregate, 
and told plaintiff it should start hauling. Then the 
Buehner plant manager told plaintiff's drivers to stop 
hauling because the bins at the Buehner plant "were 
crowded." He so admitted at the trial. (R. 485, Ab. 
69.) The trial judge was in error in suspending the 
Parol Evidence Rule to make the plaintiff a party to 
Exhibit 19-P. The opinion of this Court fails to 
correct that prejudicial error. No trier of the fact could 
reasonably find that defendants were dealing honestly 
and conscientiously with plaintiff, in the light of the 
undisputed facts, most of which are not included in the 
opinion. 
7. E X H I B I T 19-P, T H E B R I M H A L L PUR-
C H A S E ORDER, COULD NOT P R O P E R L Y 
B E C O N S T R U E D TO R E L A T E TO A N Y J O B 
E X C E P T T H E J O B D E S I G N A T E D T H E R E -
ON BY J O B NUMBER, W H I C H W A S T H E 
N E W C H U R C H B U I L D I N G J O B ; A N D I T 
COULD NOT B E C O R R E C T L Y C O N S T R U E D 
TO C O N S T I T U T E A N O P E N - E N D PUR-
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CHASE ORDER FOR A MULTIPLICITY OF 
UNRELATED JOBS NOT MENTIONED 
THEREON. 
The trial court erroneously construed Exhibit 19-
P to relate to any and all construction contracts Bueh-
ners might have, regardless of tonnage involved, not-
withstanding said "purchase order" to which plaintiff 
never was a party, specifically designated Job No. 
9-267, which was the job number for the church office 
building project, because of the following provision, 
(which was safeguard provision to prevent shortage 
in supply for a specific job) : 
"In the event additional material is needed 
said D. W. Brimhall will furnish said quantities 
of aggregate to Otto Buehner & Co. within 30 
days of notice of same by OBC to Mr. Brimhall, 
his successors or assignees, and at the same price 
as the original order and under said provisions 
as to quality." 
The total tonnage of aggregate used on the church 
building project, Job No. 9-267, as shown by Exhibit 
16-D, was only 3,355 tons, or 645 tons less than the 
4,000 tons stated in Exhibit 19-P. Defendants recog-
nized that said purchase order was not for any other 
tonnage than contemplated on the church building pro-
ject in Salt Lake City by Exhibit 30-P, the settlement 
stubs on two checks mailed by the Buehners to Brim-
hall in March 1971, more than 6 months after the Bueh-
ners had hauled away hundreds of tons of aggregate 
for other construction jobs. By Exhibit 30-P (Ab. 
118) reference was made to only the 4,000 tons men-
tioned in the purchase order accepted by Brimhall, Ex-
hibit 19-P, not the additional hundreds of tons Buehner 
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Company had taken for other unrelated jobs in August 
and September 1970. 
At the trial defendants contended that notwith-
standing less than 4,000 tons of aggregate had been 
used on the church office building, (Job No. 9-267), 
and although plaintiff never executed acceptance nor 
endorsed Exhibit 19-P, and never became a party to 
it, the Buehner Company was entitled to obtain any 
amount of plaintiff's aggregate at the price of $20.50 
per ton (which was below plaintiff's costs), for any 
job although entirely unrelated to Job No. 9-267 re-
ferred to in Exhibit 19-P. 
That the Buehners did not so construe Exhibit 
19-P in June 1970, is shown by the fact that Paul 
Buehner asked Richard C. Reimann, president of plain-
tiff for a quotation on several hundred tons for an-
other job, which he certainly would not have done if 
he had claimed Exhibit 19-P covered any and every 
construction job regardless of job number or location. 
He was quoted the regular price of $35 per ton. (R. 
459-460, Ab. 63). During the same month Marvin All-
red, plant superintendent for Buehners called Don Rei-
mann for a quotation on a job at the B.Y.U. and he 
also was given a quotation at the regular price of $35 
a ton. Plaintiff hauled some of the tonnage, although 
Buehners never issued any purchase order. As to the 
balance, the Buehners had Clark Tank Lines haul addi-
tional tonnage for those other jobs over a period of 
two months without making any disclosure as to ton-
nage for nearly a year. 
On December 31, 1970, plaintiff billed the Bueh-
ner Company, Exhibit 27-P (Ab. 118) at $35 a ton, 
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for some extra tonnage plaintiff was able to determine 
that said defendant had hauled away in August and 
September 1970 plus some tonnage delivered by plain-
tiff. Said defendant ignored the billing and gave no 
accounting, until June 1971 when suit became a cer-
tainty. Said defendant then sent Exhibit 24-P showing 
the tonnage hauled by Clark Tank Lines and Christ-
ensen Feed & Seed. (Ab. 114). Some time in June 
1971, many months after defendant Buehner Company 
obtained the additional tonnage, said defendant sent a 
check of an undisclosed amount to Brimhall, which 
Brimhall returned to the Buehner Company for reasons 
explained in a letter dated July 28, 1971, addressed to 
legal counsel for the Buehner Company, Exhibit 34-P 
(Ab. 125). In that letter Brimhall stated: 
"You stated they (American Aggregate) are 
demanding $35.00 per ton, when purchase order 
was for $20.50. Purchase Order No. U 09868, 
Job No. 9-267 was for the job I negotiated for. 
Approximately 4,000 ton for the Church office 
building. 
"* * * Mr. Paul Buehner called me, D. W. 
Brimhall, and said he would need possibly 700 
tons for another job. I told him I had no author-
ity to sell or quote a price on material for any 
other job or jobs and that he would have to 
negotiate with Mr. Don Reimann." 
As revealed by Brimhall's admissions on deposition 
and also at the trial, just prior to the meeting of Brim-
hall and Buehner with plaintiff's officers about May 
1, 1970, Buehner called Brimhall and said he antici-
pated needing an additional 700 tons (which could not 
possibly relate to the Job No. 9-267 mentioned in Ex-
hibit 19-P since the needs on that job proved to be 
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less than 4,000 tons). I t is undisputed that Brimhall 
told Buehner that he would have to get in touch with 
American Aggregate and make a deal, and that such 
additional material would have to be at a different 
quote. Further, 
" I informed him (Buehner) at this time that 
I had already overstepped my bounds with 
American Aggregate and that I had problems, 
and he would have to negotiate this with Ameri-
can Aggregate." (R. 232-233, 291-293, Ab. 31-
32,37). 
Brimhall himself, who became an adverse party 
to plaintiff in the litigation, admitted that he negoti-
ated with Buehner only on the church office job and 
that said purchase order did not relate to any other 
job, and he acknowledged he had exceeded his author-
ity in doing that, which was obvious from his other ad-
missions. The Buehners certainly would not have asked 
plaintiff for a quotation on other jobs if they then had 
entertained the slightest idea they could enlarge Ex-
hibit 19-P to relate to jobs other than Job No. 9-267. 
The trial judge in utter disregard of the Parol 
Evidence Rule, misconstrued Exhibit 19-P not only 
as binding on plaintiff when plaintiff's name was not 
even mentioned, but even amended and enlarged the 
terms to cover any and all other jobs not even men-
tioned or referred to therein, to condone defendants' 
taking of additional plaintiff's aggregate at the below-
cost price of $20.50 a ton, to the detriment of plaintiff 
and the unjust enrichment of defendants. The Buehner 
Company did not pay anything for the extra 1172 tons 
nor deposit any money therefor. Besides that, the diff-
erence between $20.50 and the regular quoted price of 
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$35 a ton, amounts to $14.50 per ton, or a total of an 
additional $16,993.00, on the extra tonnage. Plaintiff 
has never actually been paid a cent for any of the extra 
1,172 tons as pointed out under Point I. This Court 
certainly should not allow such financial disaster to 
be meted out to plaintiff or condone the unjust en-
richment of defendant Buehner Company, by uphold-
ing the trial court's misinterpretation of Exhibit 19-P 
prepared by defendants, in the light of the Parol Evi-
dence Rule and the Statute of Frauds. 
8. T H E COURT OVERLOOKED T H E 
F A C T T H A T T H E B U E H N E R S N E V E R 
P A I D F O R 90% OF T H E M A T E R I A L S D E -
L I V E R E D E A C H 30 D A Y S S P E C I F I E D I N 
E X H I B I T 19-P, A N D D E F E N D A N T S COULD 
NOT E Q U I T A B L Y B E E X C U S E D FROM 
P A Y I N G I N T E R E S T A F T E R L O N G D E -
LAYS. 
The trial court prejudicially disregarded the fact 
that the Buehner Company never complied with the 
terms of Exhibit 19-P as to payment. Buehners pre-
pared that document which specified that "90% of the 
value of material will be paid within 30 days of receipt 
of same" and "Final payment will be made upon 
completion in full of said order and within 30 days of 
said completion." Buehner never paid any attention to 
either of those requirements, and never even paid to 
Brimhall on time except on the first installment. Pay-
ment was delayed for months. The Buehner Company 
simply failed to acknowledge that it had received the 
materials when they were received, until it issued Ex-
hibit 24-P in June 1971. The final payment on the 
4,000 tons was not even mude until March 1971. 
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Nevertheless, by the judgment the trial court did 
not allow any interest, but in effect excused said de-
fendant from paying interest on the amounts it ad-
mittedly owed, but did not actually pay. Such failure 
of the trial court to award interest was clearly inequit-
able, and it should not be ratified by this Court. 
9. I T IS U N D I S P U T E D T H A T D E F E N D -
A N T S D I D NOT I S S U E A N Y P U R C H A S E 
O R D E R TO P L A I N T I F F D U R I N G T H E 
P E R I O D I N CONTROVERSY, A N D THERE 
WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF "RAT-
IFICATION" BY P L A I N T I F F O F T H E BRIM-
H A L L P U R C H A S E O R D E R OR O F A N Y 
CLAIM TO P U R C H A S E AT $20.50 P E R TON, 
S INCE P L A I N T I F F R E F U S E D TO E X E -
C U T E T H E B R I M H A L L P U R C H A S E O R D E R 
B E C A U S E I T W A S B E L O W P L A I N T I F F ' S 
Q U O T E D P R I C E S A N D ALSO B E L O W 
P L A I N T I F F ' S COSTS; B U T T H E R E W A S 
M E R E L Y AN ORAL P R O M I S E BY P L A I N -
T I F F I N MAY 1970 NOT TO SUE D E F E N D -
A N T S I F D E F E N D A N T S C O M P L I E D W I T H 
F O U R CONDITIONS, NOT ONE O F W H I C H 
W A S P E R F O R M E D . 
I t is undisputed that neither of defendants issued 
any purchase order to plaintiff for any of the plaintiff's 
aggregate taken during the period in controversy. The 
only purchase order ever issued was Exhibit 19-P, 
issued to Brimhall, the independent mining and crush-
ing contractor who expressly admitted he exceeded his 
authority, but claimed Buehner resorted to pressure to 
induce him to sign. 
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The trial court made a "finding" (actually an un-
warranted conclusion) of "ratification", but as shown 
under Point I I of appellant's Brief, the evidence 
required a finding that when plaintiff was shown Ex-
hibit 19-P about May 1, 1970, the officers of plaintiff 
refused to sign it because it was not at the prices 
quoted by plaintiff and the figure of $20.50 per ton 
was below plaintiffs costs. (R. 358-360, 453-458, Ab. 
47-48, 62-63). That most certanly did not constitute 
a ratification. There was no competent evidence of rati-
fication, for American Aggregate refused to sign or 
endorse the Brimhall purchase order Exhibit 19-P. At 
that meeting Brimhall said "there were some pretty 
hot words uttered." (R. 286, Ab. 37). Paul Buehner 
admitted that Rich Reimann asked him if he was in 
the habit of letting his janitor sign purchase orders 
for him. (R. 153-154, Ab. 21). 
I t was undisputed that at said meeting Don Rei-
mann asked Buehner if he was going to make up the 
difference in price, and he said he would not. Buehner 
admitted that he stated that whatever difference there 
was between the quoted price of American Aggregate 
and Brimhall, Brimhall would have to take care of it; 
and Buehner also said that he "had a deal" with Brim-
hall and a signed contract and he was going to hold 
him to it. (R. 153-154, Ab. 21). 
I t was undenied also that Brimhall said he was 
unable to make up the difference, and that the Rei-
manns withdrew and conferred, and then stated that 
under certain conditions "we would not bring suit 
against Buehner." Four conditions were specified: (1) 
"We had to have weigh tickets monthly." (2) "We had 
to have an accounting of payments monthly up to date." 
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(3) "The money had to be paid to American Aggre-
gate." (4) Under no condition was any more than 
4,000 tons to be taken out of that quarry, and if it was, 
it had to be paid at the full price of $35 a ton." The 
accounting had to be made every month so plaintiff 
could settle with lessors on royalty. (R. 362-363, Ab. 
48). 
Paul Buehner testified, "We did all of those con-
ditions", but declined to state what was done. (R. 
147, 151-152, Ab. 20). Buehner admitted he promised 
copies of weigh tickets, and said "we have done that", 
but when asked for proof he hedged and said he did 
not handle those matters. (R. 156, Ab. 21). Defend-
ants produced no proof of compliance with any of those 
four conditions. Brimhall admitted that "Don said they 
would not sue if they got a proper accounting each 
month, copies of weight tickets, and payment each 
month." Brimhall said he didn't deny that it was stated 
that if any material in excess of 4,000 tons was taken, 
it would be at the rate of $35 a ton. (R. 234, Ab. 32). 
Obviously, if plaintiff then had filed suit to stop the 
job the Church would have been delayed, and the prime 
contractor, other subcontractors and other innocent 
people would have been injured. 
An oral promise not to sue if certain conditions 
were performed, none of which were complied with, 
certainly could not constitute a ratification. There is 
detailed in the appellant's Brief the flagrant non-com-
pliance by defendants with those four conditions, and 
the falsity of the statement of Buehner that "We did 
all of those conditions", when there was a maze of mis-
leading information, captious delays, and conduct which 
endangered plaintiff's lease on the quarry, but no com-
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pliance with the conditions. Consequently, plaintiff 
was not barred from suing defendants. 
As pointed out by this Court in Jones v. Mutual 
Creamery Co., 81 Utah 223,17 P . 2d 256, 259, 85 A L R 
908, "ratification" is the adoption by one person of an 
act in his behalf by another, acting as his agent with-
out authority. The one who is charged with "ratifica-
tion" must be provided with all of the material facts. 
Brimhall was not an agent of plainiff, but assuming 
arguendo that plaintiff even had made him an agent 
by a written instrument, he did not act in behalf of 
plainiff at all, but adversely and to the detriment of 
plaintiff, for Exhibit 19-P did not purport to allow 
plaintiff one cent. It did not mention plaintiff and 
provided for payment of the money entirely to Brim-
hall. Nor was there a disclosure of all material facts, 
for neither Brimhall nor the Buehners disclosed even 
at the time of the meeting of May 1970, that Brimhall 
already had been paid a substantial part of what the 
Buehner Company had agreed to pay him. The Bueh-
ners continued to ignore plaintiff's condition as to pay-
ment down to June 29, 1970, by paying exclusively to 
Brimhall, and never paying directly to plaintiff. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by 
finding a "ratification" when plaintiff merely condi-
tionally promised not to sue, and since the Buehners 
did not comply, plaintiff had a right to sue. The trial 
court committed prejudicial error in dismissing plain-
tiff's complaint with prejudice, for reasons hereinabove 
and herein stated. The opinion of this Court entirely 
overlooks the undisputed evidence which shows there 
was no competent evidence of "ratification" or payment 
as required nor other performance by defendants. 
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10. D E F E N D A N T S E N G A G E D I N A COV-
E R - U P I N V O L V I N G W I T H H O L D I N G IN-
F O R M A T I O N FROM P L A I N T I F F F O R 
M A N Y M O N T H S , A N D T H E F U R N I S H I N G 
O F F A L S E I N F O R M A T I O N , W H I C H D I S -
C R E D I T E D D E F E N D A N T S . 
The Brief of appellant points briefly to informa-
tion withheld, and apparently this Court has over-
looked it entirely. Neither Brimhall nor the Buehners 
saw fit to send plaintiff a copy of Exhibit 19-P. Bueh-
ner expressly admitted that no copy was ever sent. 
(R. 147, Ab. 20). Defendants concealed until the time 
of trial, the issuance of a contract to Clark Tank Lines 
for hauling 4,000 tons of plaintiff's aggregate, Ex-
hibit 5-D dated November 11, 1969. That document 
refers to Job No. 9-267. Part of the cover-up involved 
Brimhall's telling plaintiff that Buehners were going to 
use the aggregate and to start hauling, so that plaintiff 
would be lulled into a sense of security and anticipate a 
purchase order. Then the Buehner plant superintendent 
admittedly told the plaintiff's drivers in November 
1969 not to bring any more material in because "our 
bins were crowded." (R. 485, Ab. 69). However, 
Clark Tank Lines continued to haul, as was subse-
quently revealed at the trial. 
Defendants withheld weigh tickets promised, and 
also withheld any accounting, except an inadequate 
letter dated June 16, 1970, (Exhibit 25-P, which gave 
no tonnage and the amounts shown as paid were less 
than the amounts actually received. Such letter did not 
reveal the actual tonnage obtained nor disclose that 
the $5,000 for pretended "movein" was included. 
Paul Buehner neglected to respond to telephone 
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calls when plaintiff's officers called to obtain in-
formation, and finally referred them to Brimhall 
who was leaving for Mexico. Defendant promised to 
furnish accountings and weigh tickets so that plain-
tiff could comply with the requirements of its lease on 
the quarry; but defendants failed and neglected to do 
so. No weigh tickets were ever furnished. Clark Tank 
Lines and Christensen Feed & Seed furnished plaintiff 
reports on tonnage hauled which were understated by 
as much as 50%, and not until June 1971, just before 
suit was filed, did the defendant corporation condescend 
to furnish any semblance of an accurate account of 
tonnage hauled by contract carriers Clark and by 
Christensen. 
When plaintiff told Clark Tank Lines to stop 
hauling, when plaintiff was unable to extract inform-
ation, plaintiff was told to "go to hell." (R. 372-378, 
Ab. 49-50). The Buehner Company office manager in 
February 1970, when asked when plaintiff was going 
to be paid, bluntly declared, "You are not going to get 
paid." (R. 451-453, Ab. 61-62). Reasonable minds 
would have to conclude that the defendants were dis-
credited by their unconscionable conduct and declara-
tions, and their manifestations of intent to defraud the 
plaintiff. 
11. T H E F I G U R E OF $20.50 P E R TON 
W A S B E L O W P L A I N T I F F S COSTS; CON-
S E Q U E N T L Y , T H I S COURT E R R E D IN NOT 
C O N S I D E R I N G T H E I S S U E OF L I A B I L I T Y 
OF D E F E N D A N T S FOR V I O L A T I O N S OF 
T H E U T A H U N F A I R P R A C T I C E S ACT A N D 
S T A T U T E S P R O H I B I T I N G P R I C E - F I X I N G 
A N D R E S T R A I N T OF T R A D E , W H I C H R E N -
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D E R E D VOID A N Y P U R P O R T E D A G R E E -
M E N T ORAL OR W R I T T E N W H I C H W A S 
D E S I G N E D TO O B T A I N P L A I N T I F F ' S 
GOODS A T A P R I C E B E L O W I T S COSTS. 
The claim of illegality of defendants' conduct 
under the statutes was urged from the beginning by 
plaintiff's counsel. Apparently the trial court adopted 
the unfounded argument of the counsel for defendants 
that those statutes were "inapplicable" or "unconstitu-
tional". No defense of "unconstitutionality" of either 
statute was urged in the brief filed by respondents. 
Counsel merely attempted to cite an unfinished case in 
the Federal court to assert that the Utah Unfair Prac-
tices Act is inapplicable. Such citation has no applica-
tion to this litigation. 
Since Paul Buehner admitted under oath that his 
company was a competitor of plaintiff in the aggregate 
business, he knew that he had no right to dictate plain-
tiff's prices. He knew that his company had even pur-
chased this same kind of aggregate at $35 a ton, and he 
recognized plaintiff's right to establish its own prices 
for its own goods by asking plaintiff for a price quota-
tion on 4,000 tons of selected sizes for the new church 
office building job. No contention has been made in 
this case that plaintiff was guilty of misleading defend-
ants. The plaintiff quoted $29.50 a ton both before 
and after Otto Buehner & Company was awarded the 
subcontract on the caststone. Paul Buehner was deter-
mined his company was going to chisel and not pay 
plaintiff's quoted price although he knew his company 
had to have this particular material. The original Brief 
details the subterfuge to which Buehner resorted, 
threats of substitution to cheat and defraud the Church, 
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and also the prime contractor. The tactics to which 
Buehner resorted were neither ethical nor honest, nor 
lawful. 
Section 50-1-2 makes a person guilty of a conspir-
acy to defraud who enters into an agreement or com-
bination or confederation to regulate or "fix the price 
of any article or merchandise or commodity". Section 
50-1-3 makes it unlawful for any corporation, agent 
or person to enter into any combination or agreement 
(among other things) to monopolize any part of trade 
or commerce in this State. Section 50-1-6 specified that 
"Any contract or agreement in violation of any pro-
vision of this chapter shall be absolutely void." Section 
50-1-10 provides for treble damages. The agreement 
made by the Buehners with Brimhall was to fix the 
price on plaintiff's goods, not merely to defraud the 
plaintiff, but to monopolize the trade in those goods 
by dispossessing plaintiff. 
The appendix to the Brief of Appellant quotes the 
pertinent provisions of the Utah Unfair Practices Act, 
Title 13, Chapter 5, U.C.A. 1953. Section 17 states 
that the purpose of the act is to prohibit unfair and dis-
criminatory practices by which fair and honest competi-
tion is destroyed or prevented. Section 3 makes un-
lawful price discrimination, either which promotes mon-
opoly or destroys or prevents competition. Section 7 
makes it unlawful to offer to sell or to sell merchandise 
either by a retailer or wholesale, "at less than cost as 
defined in this act" to injure a competitor, or to pre-
vent competition. "Cost includes raw materials, labor 
and all overhead expenses. Section 13 makes contracts 
in violation illegal and denies recovery thereon. 
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Defendants not only attempted to fix plaintiff's 
prices which they had no lawful right to do, but de-
manded discrimination in price, at a point below plain-
tiff's cost. When plaintiff refused, the Buehners con-
spired with the crushing contractor to fix those prices 
below cost and to obtain plaintiffs goods at a figure 
below cost. Plaintiff made its quotations available to 
all persons in the field for like quantity. Plaintiff 
claims a ruthless violation of both statutes herein men-
tioned, and detailed in its brief the acts which consti-
tuted those violations whereby defendants were un-
justly enriched. 
This Court has not even mentioned the issues, and 
we believe those issues are of paramount importance 
and should not be brushed aside. While denying that 
plaintiff consented to Exhibit 19-P, which plaintiff did 
not execute nor ratify, because it was at a figure be-
low plaintiff's cost, even if plaintiff had consented and 
signed such a contract, it would have been void. The 
evidence is clear that plaintiff's expenses including 
overhead expenses, exceeded the figure of $20.50 per 
ton. While the trial court refused to allow plaintiff to 
establish in detail those expenses, Brimhall himself told 
what some of them were, so that the record clearly 
shows that $20.50 per ton was below plaintiff's costs, 
as detailed in appellant's Brief. Futhermore, the con-
duct of defendants was unconscionable and resulted in 
unjust and unlawful enrichment of defendants. 
12. P A U L B U E H N E R P R A C T I C E D D E -
C E I T U P O N B R I M H A L L TO I N D U C E H I M 
TO A C C E P T E X H I B I T 19-P; D E F E N D A N T S 
ALSO A T T E M P T E D TO P R A C T I C E D E C E I T 
U P O N P L A I N T I F F , A N D E V E N P R A C T I C E D 
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D E C E I T U P O N T H E T R I A L COURT BY F I C -
T I T I O U S CLAIMS ON C O U N T E R C L A I M 
A N D BY F A L S E T E S T I M O N Y , SO T H A T 
D E F E N D A N T S A N D T H E I R W I T N E S S E S 
COULD NOT R E A S O N A B L Y BE B E L I E V E D 
BY T H E COURT ON A N Y M A T T E R I N CON-
F L I C T W I T H T H E T E S T I M O N Y OF P L A I N -
T I F F ' S W I T N E S S E S A N D A D M I S S I O N S O F 
D E F E N D A N T S M A D E ON CROSS-EXAMIN-
ATION, W H E T H E R T H E D O C T R I N E O F 
E S T O P P E L ON O A T H OR QUASI E S T O P P E L 
IS INVOKED. 
Paul Buehner failed to trick plaintiff's officers by 
his false representations of substitution of materials, 
and by false representations that he could obtain the 
same materials elsewhere; but he did manage to de-
ceive Brimhall. Buehner used Brimhall to attempt to 
knock down plainiff's quoted prices, and then falsely 
represented to Brimhall that his company planned to 
take "crusher run" instead of selected sizes. When 
Brimhall reported back a quotation from plaintiff of 
$25.50 as the lowest figure for "crusher run", Buehner 
did not only arbitrarily declared "No deal", but he then 
offered Brimhall $5,000 to sign acceptance of a pur-
chase order to sell to the Buehner Company plaintiff's 
aggregate at a below-cost price of $20.50 per ton. Brim-
hall testified that Buehner said he was going to take 
"all sizes", but when Exhibit 19-P was prepared it was 
for "selected sizes" which proved that the representa-
tion which Buehner admitted that he made to Brimhall 
was a hoax. 
In addiion to the fraud and deceitful tactics pre-
vious mentioned and detailed in the Brief, defendants 
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Buehner also practiced deceit upon the trial court which 
this Honorable Court should not tolerate. By the 
Buehner Company second claim in its amended count-
erclaim it acknowledged that the provision in Exhibit 
19-P for additional aggregate referred only to the 
Church job, for defendant falsely alleged that it needed 
some additional material of designated sizes for the 
Church office building job, and notified American Ag-
gregate and Brimhall (which was false because Ameri-
can Aggregate was not a party to the purchase order 
and was not notified), but they "refused" to deliver it. 
(R. 715). The Buehner Company made the fictitious 
claim that it was damaged $7,000 by having to crush 
larger sizes of materials. The Buehners knew they had 
contracted with Clark Tank Lines to haul away 4,000 
tons of materials belonging to plaintiff (Exhibit 5-D); 
that defendants had complete control of the hauling of 
the 4,000 tons; and that Buehner employees instructed 
the drivers what sizes to haul. (R. 52-59, 63-66, 187, 
Ab. 7-9, 25). 
To illustrate the falsity of the claims and testimony 
of defendants, for over a year the Buehners would not 
divulge to plaintiff as tonnage or sizes what the Bueh-
ner Company through its contract carriers had hauled 
away, but defendant company continued to help itself 
to such sizes of aggregate as Buehners decided to take. 
I t was finally admitted at the trial under oath that the 
Buehner Company had changed the sizes of the ag-
gregates it decided to use. (R. 469-470, Ab. 65). By 
its own neglect and bungling operations, the Buehner 
Company left at the quarry 200 tons of the sizes it 
claimed it needed, in consequence of which it falsely 
claimed it had to crush 1,000 tons of jumbo size. (R. 
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342, 497-502, Ab. 43, 71). To further illustrate the de-
ceitful character of defendants' evidence, on cross-ex-
amination Marvin Allred, plant superintendent proved 
that the pretended "shortage" of certain sizes was due 
to the fact that the Buehners had secretly diverted 
some of those materials from the Church job to an 
entirely unrelated job. (R. 485-486, 494-495, Ab. 58-
70). Exhibit 16-D shows that the total tonnage used 
on the Church office job was only 3,355 tons. Allred 
had estimated that the tonnage would be 3,500. (R. 
494-495, Ab. 70). 
Buehners also sought unlawfully by the practice 
of deceit to exact another $7,000 by a fourth claim by 
falsely asserting that plaintiff (and Brimhall) had 
delivered a lot of materials in excess of the Brimhall 
purchase order; that said defendant paid Clark Tank 
Lines $7,000 for hauling such excess materials (R. 
716), when the Buehners knew they had contracted the 
hauling away of those additional materials. The Bueh-
ners attempted to "add insult to injury" by urging in 
court a fictitious claim that plaintiff had damaged said 
defendant corporation by delivery charges of Clark 
Tank Lines which Buehners had secretly contracted 
and over which plaintiff had no possible control. 
This Court apparently overlooked or did not con-
sider any of the points raised by appellant. The fic-
titious claims of $14,000 for pretended "damages" 
which the Buehners injected into the case and took 
more than a day to confuse the trial court, further dis-
credit all of defendants' testimony in any possible con-
flict with plaintiff's evidence. 
Consequently, there is no real credible evidence to 
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support defendants. Reasonable minds could not be-
lieve they told the truth when they proved facts on 
cross-examination that their claims were false and 
amounted to the practice of deceit upon the court, and 
would justify treble damages for plaintiff even if the 
quoted statutes did not so provide. 
The defendants made crucial admissions in sup-
port of the claims of the plaintiff, in addition to the 
undisputed facts stated in the opinion which this Court 
doubtless has overlooked. Later in the trial defendants 
attempted to testify contrary to their earlier admissions 
and testimony, as hereinabove noted. Both Buehner 
and Brimhall testified on deposition and on cross-ex-
amination in support of plaintiff's claims, then Buehner 
later attempted to contradict or twist those admissions, 
but the trial court erroneously refused to allow plain-
tiff to rebut the attempted contradictions those prior 
admissions. 
As aptly stated in 31 C.J.S. Sec. 117 (b) Judicial 
estoppel: 
"The rule is well established that during the 
course of litigation a party is not permitted to 
assume or occupy inconsistent and contradictory 
positions, and while this rule is frequently re-
fered to as 'judicial estoppel', it more properly 
is a rule which estops a party to play fast-and-
loose with the courts." 
As stated in Martin v. Wood, 71 Ariz. 457, 229 P . 
2d 710: 
"This doctrine is said to have its foundation 
in the obligation under which every man is placed 
to speak and act according to the truth of the 
case, and in the policy of the law to suppress the 
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mischiefs from the destruction of all confidence 
in intercourse and dealings of men, if they were 
allowed to deny that which by their solemn and 
deliberate acts they have declared to be true." 
The trial court, whether by forgetfulness or other-
wise, should not be allowed to isolate subsequent state-
ments made by defendants or Brimhall inconsistent 
with what they previously by solemn admissions had 
acknowledged to be the truth. I t became apparent that 
it was advantageous for them to change their stories. 
There was manifested a determination to cheat and 
defraund the plaintiff, as fully demonstrated at the 
trial by false claims, by attempting to twist solemn 
admissions made on cross-examination to mean some-
thing else, which this Court should not tolerate, nor 
condone. The opinion omits all reference to those situ-
ations although mentioned in the appellant's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The opinion states only part of the undisputed 
facts, and bases the affirmance on stories which were 
proved to be false and on which the trial court made 
no finding. All of the points on issues raised in the 
Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant have been overlooked 
for they have not even been mentioned. There was un-
just enrichment of the defendants, and that fact is not 
mentioned, nor are other undisputed facts and admis-
sions which defendants later attempted to wipe out or 
to twist by half-truths. 
We believe that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to 
a rehearing on all of the issues raised, none of which 
was mentioned and apparently omitted from consider-
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ation. An attempt has been made herein to call atten-
tion to facts including admissions on which reasonable 
minds cannot differ, and which in equity and good 
conscience would require reversal of those portions of 
the judgment from which appeal was taken. 
We respectfully request that there be rehearing 
and opportunity for oral argument. We also request 
the rereading of the Abstract and the Briefs, as well 
as a careful examination of this Brief in Support of 
Petition for Rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul E. Reimann 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
A M E R I C A N A G G R E G A T E 
CORPORATION 
Petitioner 
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